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PRIORITIES, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
AND CONSUMER FINANCING
DAVID H. VERNON*
INTRODUCTION
The special treatment given secured transactions involving con-
sumer goods under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code' is, at
times, inequitable and, at other times, gives rise to undesirable and
unnecessary uncertainties in commercial situations. In part, moreover,
the Code's handling of the financing of consumer purchases is not only
unrealistic but penalizes the consumer-buyer by holding him to a
commercial standard of conduct with which he is unfamiliar.
To highlight the problems in this area, discussion shall be centered
around hypothetical consumer-financing transactions. These will be
analyzed in terms of Code rules, the Code's solution evaluated, and,
in some cases, adjustments in Code language suggested to permit a
clearer, more equitable alignment of the rights of the parties.
CONSUMER-BUYERS AND CONSUMER-SELLERS
To understand the Code's operation in the area of consumer
financing, the following rules, established by the Code, must be kept
in mind and their interaction understood:
1. Goods are consumer goods only "if they are used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."'
2. Goods are classified as "equipment" if they do not fit into the
other three Code categories: consumer goods, farm products
or inventory.3
3. A purchase money security interest in consumer goods may be
perfected without filing and without taking possession. 4
4. A purchase money security interest in consumer goods which
is perfected but unfiled is subject to being defeated by a good
faith consumer-buyer of the goods from a consumer-seller. 5
* Associate Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1 The version of the Uniform Commercial Code dealt with is that found in the two-
volume UCC edition published by the Edward Thompson Company in 1962. It is part of
the Uniform Laws Annotated Series, and includes the 1963 Official Recommendations of
the Permanent Editorial Board.
2 UCC § 9-109(1).
3 UCC § 9-109. "Goods are . . . ( 2) 'equipment' if they are used or bought for use
primarily in business (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-
profit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not in-
cluded in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods. . . ."
4 UCC 9 -302(1). "A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security inter-
ests except the following: • . (d) a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods . . . ."
5 UCC § 9-307(2). "In the case of consumer goods .. , a buyer takes free of a
security interest even though perfected if he buys without knowledge of the security
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5. A non-purchase money security interest in consumer goods
may be perfected only (a) by filing or (b) by the secured
party's taking possession of the goods.°
6. A security interest in consumer goods which is perfected by
filing is not subject to being defeated by a good faith consumer-
buyer of the goods from a consumer-seller.'
7. Priorities between conflicting security interests in the same
collateral are determined by the order of their perfection unless
both are perfected by filing in which case the order of filing
controls.'
8. A buyer in ordinary course from a retail seller takes the goods
free of any security interest in them even though the interest
is perfected if, but only if, that interest was created by the
retailer.'
9. A buyer of goods not in ordinary course of business prevails
over the holder of an unperfected security interest to the extent
that, while the interest remains unperfected, such buyer gives
interest, for value and for his own personal, family or household purposes . . . unless
prior to the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such
goods." As stated above, the rule is couched in terms of a "consumer-buyer from a
consumer-seller." The fact that the buyer must be buying for, his own personal, family
or household purposes is set forth clearly in the section. That the seller must be a
"consumer-seller" is less clear. The section reads, "In the case of consumer goods," a
buyer takes free of specified security interests. In the hands of a retailer, goods are not
consumer goods, but inventory. UCC § 9-109(4). For a seller to be selling consumer
goods, necessarily, the seller must have used them or bought them for personal, family
or household purposes. Subsection (I) of 9-307 covers the case of a retail sale. Here
knowledge is not a factor.
6 Under UCC § 9-302, all security interests except those listed are required to be
filed in order to be perfected. Non-purchase money interests in consumer goods are not
listed among the exceptions. UCC § 9-305 provides that "A security interest in . .
goods ... may be perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral."
T UCC § 9-307(2). See note 5 supra.
8 This statement of the Code rule is accurate for present purposes of discussion. It is
subject to exceptions, however, as provided in UCC 9-312(1), (2), (3) and (4) al-
though none of the exceptions are applicable herein.
That portion of UCC § 9-312(5) which is applicable reads as follows:
(5) In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section), priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows:
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing, regardless of which
security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and whether it attached
before or after filing;
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing, regardless
of which security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and, in the case
of a filed security interest, whether it attached before or after filing . . . .
0 UCC § 9-307(1). "A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section
1-201) ... takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence." (Emphasis
supplied.)
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value and takes possession without knowledge° of the exist-
ence of the security interest."
10. A buyer of goods not in ordinary course includes any person
buying from a seller not in the business of selling goods of the
kind involved.'
PROBLEM I
Alan Able buys a refrigerator from the Hart Depart-
ment Store, paying $50 down and signing a note for the
balance of $480. At the same time,- he signs a security
agreement specifying the refrigerator as the collateral and
designating Hart as the secured party. No document relat-
ing to the transaction is filed. Hart delivers the refrigerator
to Alan's home.
About a week after making the purchase, Alan loses
his job. Needing money, he tells his neighbor, Bob Bobble,
that he is taking a new job in Tucson and that he does not
wish to transport the refrigerator. Alan does not mention
that he had paid only $50 down, and he offers to sell the
refrigerator to Bob for $75 less than he had paid for it, i.e.,
a total price to Bob of $455. Bob agrees to buy the refrig-
erator and gives Alan $55 to bind the deal.
(1) The Consumer-Buyer and Unfiled Security Interests
To the facts of Problem I, add the following:
a. Alan then goes to the Chad Loan Company, and using
the refrigerator as collateral, borrows $200. Alan signs
a security agreement designating Chad Loan Company
as the secured party and specifying the refrigerator as
the collateral. By 10:00 a.m. the next day, Alan has
finished packing and he delivers the refrigerator to Bob's
house, receiving from him the balance due on the purchase
price. At 11:00 a.m. the same morning, Chad Loan files
the security agreement in the o f ice of the Secretary of
State.
14) UCC § 1-201(25). "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when (a) he
has actual knowledge of it. . . ."
11 UCC § 9-301(1). Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unper-
fected security interest is subordinate to the rights of . . . (c) in the case of
goods ... a person who is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk
or other buyer not in ordinary course of business to the extent that he gives
value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected . . . (Emphasis supplied.]
12 UCC § 1-201(9) defines a buyer in ordinary course of business as one who buys
goods in the ordinary course "from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind."
Thus, anyone buying goods from one not in the business of selling goods of the kind in
question should be classified as a buyer not in ordinary course.
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Applying the Code rules to 1(a), both Hart and Chad Loan hold
perfected security interests in the refrigerator. Chad Loan's interest
has been perfected by filing." Since Hart, holds a purchase money
security interest in consumer goods, its interest was perfected without
filing." As between the two, Hart, having perfected first, has a pri-
ority over Chad Loan."
Bob, however, takes the refrigerator free of both interests. The
refrigerator belongs in the category of consumer goods, Alan having
purchased it for "household purposes!'" And since Bob bought it
from Alan for his personal or family use, section 9-307(2) operates
to cut out Hart's security interest. As applied to consumer goods, the
section reads:
In the case of consumer goods . ., a buyer takes free of
a security interest even though perfected if he buys without
knowledge of the security interest, for value and for his own
personal, family or household purposes . . . unless prior to
the purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement
covering such goods.
At the time Bob bought the refrigerator from Alan, Hart's interest,
though perfected, was unfiled. And Chad Loan's non-purchase money
interest being unified at the time was not perfected until after the sale
to Bob.' The section, therefore, operates to give Bob ownership of the
refrigerator free of any existing security interests.
b. Assume that Alan, rather than selling the refrigerator to
Bob, his neighbor, sells it to Dandy Appliance Company,
a dealer in second-hand appliances, and that he completes
the delivery to Dandy and is paid at 10:00 a.m., one hour
before Chad Loan filed with the Secretary of State. As-
sume further that at 10:30 that morning, Bob purchases
the refrigerator from Dandy Appliance.
On these adjusted facts, Dandy Appliance would take the refrig-
erator subject to Hart's perfected but unfiled security interest." Since
Chad Loan's interest was unperfected at the time of the sale to Dandy
13 UCC § 9-302.
14 Rule 3—UCC § 9-302(1) (d). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
15 Rule 7—UCC § 9-312(5) (b). See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16 Rule 1—UCC § 9-109(1). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
17 UCC § 9 -302.
18 UCC 9-307 provides for buyers of goods taking free of security interests when
such interests are perfected. Since Dandy Appliance is neither a buyer in ordinary course
of business nor one buying for his own personal, family or household purposes, it does
not come within the group afforded protection by 9-307. Thus Dandy takes subject to
the perfected interest of Hart.
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Appliance, the appliance company, as a buyer not in ordinary course,"
would take free of Chad Loan's security interest." Hart, having per-
fected its interest first, again would have a priority over Chad Loan."
But what of Bob? He was a buyer in ordinary course from a
retailer." In the normal retail sale, the Code's treatment is to permit
the buyer in ordinary course to take free of any security interest in
the retailer's inventory. Thus, section 9-307(1) provides: "A buyer in
ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and
even though the buyer knows of its existence." The buyer in ordinary
course, however, takes free of a perfected security interest in inventory
only if his seller is the one who created the security interest. Here,
Alan created it, not Dandy Appliance. Bob, therefore, although a
buyer in ordinary course, is not protected by 9-307(1). Nor does
section 9-307(2) offer any shelter since it only protects a consumer-
buyer when he purchases goods which are consumer goods in the
hands of his vendor.' In the appliance store's hands, obviously, the
refrigerator is inventory.24
Alan could have transferred the refrigerator to Bob free of any
security interest if he had sold it to him directly. Due to the inter-
vention of a non-consumer buyer in the chain, however, Bob takes the
refrigerator subject to Hart's interest, although free of Chad Loan's.
This difference in treatment cannot be justified. Under the en-
trusting provision of Article 2 [section 2-403(2)1, "any entrusting
of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business." Applying this provision, the Code favors
the innocent buyer from a retailer over an owner of property who
makes it possible for the buyer to see the goods displayed and, thus,
to purchase them. By entrusting the goods to the merchant's posses-
sion, the owner must make a judgment as to the merchant's honesty.
The section, in essence, makes him pay for his error in judgment.
Where the owner makes no such error, i.e., where the goods are stolen
from the owner and then placed in the hands of a merchant, the "en-
trusting" provision favors the owner over the buyer in ordinary
course. 25
19 Rule 10.---UCC § 1-201(9). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20 Rule 9—UCC § 9-301(1)(c). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21 Supra note 15.
22 UCC § 1-201(9).
23 See supra note 5.
24 UCC § 9-109(4).
25 The applicable portions of UCC § 2-403 read as follows:
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods
of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention
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Applying the policy established in the entrusting provision to
section 9-307(1), and to the case at hand, what result would be forth-
coming? Both Hart and Chad Loan, by advancing funds to Alan,
made a calculated decision to trust Alan. They trusted him to repay
what he borrowed. By allowing him possession of the refrigerator,
they trusted him not to dispose of it in derogation of his duties to
them. In essence, Hart and Chad Loan made the same error in judg-
ment as that made by the owner of goods when he entrusts them to
a merchant who in bad faith sells the goods in ordinary course. In
both cases, the parties act for their own benefit, i.e.,.Chad Loan and
Hart act in the expectation of being paid, and the owner acts for his
own purposes, either to have the goods repaired or stored, or to have
them sold.
In assessing fault, it must be remembered that the lenders made it
possible for Alan to dispose of the refrigerator. By leaving him in
possession as they did, they made it possible for Alan to defraud
Bob, and they did this in expectation of payment. If the entrusting
provision of Article 2 is justifiable and proper, and I believe it is,
the different results reached under section 9-307(1), as stated above,
are unjustifiable and improper. I would urge that a buyer in ordinary
course from a retail merchant should take free of any security interest
in the goods he buys regardless of who creates the security interest. I
would suggest to the Permanent Editorial Board, therefore, that the
language of section 9-307(1) be adjusted as follows to reflect this
policy:
(1) A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection
(9) of section 1-201) other than a person buying farm prod-
ucts from a person engaged in farming operations takes
free of a security interest [created by his seller] in the goods
he buys even though the security interest is perfected and
even though the buyer knows of its existence. [Deletions
are bracketed. New language is italicized.]
(ii) The Consumer-Buyer and Filed Security Interests: Circuity
c. Assume that Chad Loan Company advanced the funds
to Alan and filed the security agreement with the Secre-
tary of State before Alan discussed the sale of the ref rig-
erator with Bob. Assume further that Alan then sold the
refrigerator to Bob, his neighbor, Bob intending to use
the refrigerator in his home.
of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the
delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the
entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be
larcenous under the criminal law.
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Here again, because it perfected first, Hart is prior to Chad Loan. 26
But Hart's interest can be defeated by the operation of section 9-307
(2) which permits a person in Bob's position to prevail over a perfected
but unfiled security interest. However, while thus taking free of Hart's
claim, Bob does take subject to Chad Loan's interest because Chad
Loan filed prior to the sale to him. Under 9-307(2) Bob prevails
only over perfected security interests which are unfiled. Thus, on
these facts, we end up with a circuity of interests:
I. Hart is superior to Chad Loan but inferior to Bobble.
2. Chad Loan is superior to Bobble but inferior to Hart.
3. Bobble is superior to Hart but inferior to Chad Loan.
The circuity of interests created by the Code, if and when the
cases arise in fact, somehow must be broken. How best to adjust the
competing interests is not easy of solution. Weighing the comparative
innocence of the competing parties, however, and taking into account
the Code's general approach tending to discourage non-purchase money
secured financing of consumers, it is urged that Bob, the consumer-
buyer, should prevail.'"
I. Non-Purchase Money Consumer Financing
As suggested, the Code draftsmen seem to have gone out of their
way to discourage secured transactions involving consumer goods ex-
cept where purchase money is being supplied. A purchase money secu-
rity interest in consumer goods may be perfected without filing. Filing
or possession, of course, is necessary if the nature of the interest is non-
purchase money. This alone would not indicate an attempt to discour-
age non-purchase money advances on the security of household goods.
But since the secured vendor is able to perfect his interest without
making it a matter of public record, a prospective lender after the fact
has no effective means of ascertaining the existence of a prior security
interest. Section 9-208, which establishes a method for obtaining in-
formation concerning a prior security interest in proposed collateral,
does not work effectively when consumer goods are involved. Under
the section, the person of whom inquiry is made has two weeks in
which to give the requested information. A prospective borrower wish-
ing to use his household furnishings as collateral normally is not in a
position to wait fourteen days before obtaining the money he desires.
In the very competitive small loan area, the lender would seem to be
put to a choice of advancing the funds without checking on prior inter-
ests, or having the borrower go elsewhere.
26 Supra note 15.
27 With such a solution, i.e., the consumer-buyer taking free of all security interests,
we need not proceed to the point of allocating priorities between Chad Loan and Hart.
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When the purchase money secured party forecloses, the Code re-
quires that he give notice of his action to all secured parties of record
and to those of whom he has knowledge unless the collateral is con-
sumer goods." If consumer goods are involved, the foreclosing pur-
chase money creditor need not give notice to other secured parties even
when he is aware of their existence." And, of course, if the holder of the
purchase money interest sells the goods on foreclosure, the buyer takes
free of any junior interest." Finally, the Code wisely prohibits after-
acquired property clauses where consumer goods are involved unless
the consumer acquires the property within ten days of the secured
party's giving of value.". Thus, unless purchase money is supplied, the
after-acquired property clause is inoperative.
If I am right and if these sections of the Code exhibit a distaste for
non-purchase money financing with consumer goods as collateral, a
court might be urged to break the circle by finding against the non-
purchase money secured party—in the instant case, against Chad Loan
Company.
2. Competing Equities
Beyond the general Code policy, an examination of the comparative
equities of the competing parties again calls for a holding in favor of
the consumer-buyer. While it is true that Chad Loan has no effective
means of preventing its borrower, Alan, from disposing of the refriger-
ator, as a lender Chad Loan is in the business of assuming such a risk.
The consumer-buyer, on the other hand, acts without any understand-
ing that a risk is involved. The only risk he consciously undertakes
involves the functioning of the refrigerator as such. Chad Loan can
and should be careful about lending its money. Some form of credit
investigation prior to lending can be made in a relatively short period
of time--a much shorter time than it would take to discover if an
unfiled purchase money interest exists. The lender is paid to assume
the risk of a borrower's honesty. Chad Loan can be said to have as-
sumed the risk of Alan's defalcation. Bob did what he did in complete
ignorance that such a risk was involved.
The fact that Chad Loan filed the security agreement should not
operate in its favor as against Bob. (The same would be true if Hart
filed.) Consequently section 9-307(2) operates unfairly against a con-
sumer-buyer. It is unrealistic to believe that such a buyer will check
the record, and such a burden should not be placed on him. The sec-
tion as now written permits a secured party who has filed to shift the
risk of loss from himself to a person who had nothing to do with the
28 UCC § 9-504(3).
29 Ibid.
30 UCC § 9-504(4).
31 UCC § 9-204(4) (b).
538
PRIORITIES, THE UCC AND CONSUMER FINANCING
lender's decision to commit his funds. "On the one hand we have a
person [the lender] taking a calculated risk and being paid for it; on
the other hand we have one who does not understand that any risk is
involved. Why should the latter bear the loss?" 82
Insofar as section 9-307(2) permits the holder of a filed security
interest to prevail over a noncommercial buyer, it operates unfairly by
imposing commercial standards of conduct on a person who is unaware
of the standards. Since this is true, and since the existence of the cir-
cuity gives the court a relatively free hand in solving the problem, I
would urge that the consumer-buyer be permitted to prevail over Chad
Loan as well as over Hart.
It is submitted that the provision should be amended to prevent the
circuity from arising and to place the risk of dishonest dealing with the
collateral on the group being paid to assume the risk—on the lenders.
I therefore urge that consideration be given to amending 9-307(2) to
read as follows:
(2) In the case of consumer goods and in the case of
farm equipment having an original purchase price not in excess
of $2500.00 (other than fixtures, see Section 9-313), a buyer
takes free of a security interest even though perfected if he
buys without knowledge of the security interest, for value and
for his own personal, family or household purposes or his own
farming operations [unless prior to the purchase the secured
party has filed a financing statement covering such goods].
[Deletions are bracketed.]
(iii) When Are Consumer Goods Not Consumer Goods?
d. Assume that Alan, when he purchased the refrigerator from
Hart, did so with the present intention of defrauding Hart,
Chad Loan and Bob, and that he never intended to use the
refrigerator, nor did he use it, for personal, family or
household purposes. Assume further the facts set forth
under (a), i.e., that the sale to Bob was consummated
prior to Chad Loan's filing in the office of the Secretary of
State.
Under the Code definition, goods are consumer goods only "if they
are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household
purposes."32 (Emphasis supplied.) Here, Alan purchased the refrigera-
tor for use primarily—or entirely—in defrauding other persons and
this is the only use to which it was put. The refrigerator, thus, cannot
32 Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 47 Iowa L.
Rev. 346, 364 (1962).
83 Supra note 16.
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be classified as consumer goods. Under Code usage, it properly belongs
in the equipment category, it being the catch-all for goods which fit in
no other group. 34
If the refrigerator is classified as equipment rather than consumer
goods, Hart's unfiled purchase money security interest would be un-
perfected." To perfect a purchase money interest in equipment, the
secured party either must take possession of the equipment, or file."
Hart has done neither. Chad Loan, having filed, has a perfected in-
terest in the refrigerator and would have a priority. in the collateral over
any claim of Hart.
If the refrigerator were consumer goods in Alan's hands, 9-307(2)
would operate in Bob's favor as against Chad Loan, since its interest
was filed after Bob bought the refrigerator. However, that section is
not operative because equipment is involved. If Chad Loan's interest
is to be defeated by the sale to Bob, it must be by virtue of some other
Code section. In treating unperfected security interests, the Code pro-
vides in section 9-301(1) that
. . [A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the
rights of
(c) in the case of goods . .. a person who is not a se-
cured party and who is a . . . buyer not in ordinary course
of business to the extent that he gives value and receives de-
livery of the collateral without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected; .. .
Bob is a buyer not in ordinary course since he bought the equipment
from Alan, a person not in the business of selling goods of the kind in
question.'" Bob, therefore, would take the refrigerator free of Chad
Loan's security interest.
It is interesting to note that on the facts of (b), where Alan sold
the refrigerator to Dandy Appliance, which in turn sold to Bob, the
result would be changed if, due to Alan's fraudulent intention, the re-
frigerator is classified as equipment rather than as consumer goods. In
such a case, both Hart and Chad Loan would have unperfected security
interests at the time of Alan's sale to Dandy Appliance. Since Dandy
Appliance comes within the provisions of section 9-301(1) (c) as a
buyer not in ordinary course, having purchased from Alan, a non-
merchant, the appliance company would take free of any security in-
34 Rule 2—UCC § 9-109(2). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
36 UCC § 9-302, which provides exceptions to the filing rule, contains none for the
perfection of a security interest in equipment except for the secured party's taking
possession.
36
 Ibid.
37 Supra note 19.
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terest. And Bob, of course, would acquire from it whatever interest the
appliance company had." So we have a situation in which a consumer-
buyer takes a greater interest in goods if they can be classified as
equipment rather than as consumer goods.
The definition of consumer goods, further, fails to be very helpful
in a situation where the buyer is free to put the goods to use either for
his business or household purposes." Thus, assume a case where a
doctor has his offices located in a wing of his house. If the doctor buys
four chairs from a furniture company, two for his livingroom and two
for his waiting room, the former will be classified as consumer goods
while the latter are called equipment. The vendor will not know the
difference. And a week after delivery, the doctor may decide to shift
the waiting room chairs to the livingroom and the livingroom chairs to
the waiting room. Here, under the statutory definition, the two living-
room chairs (now located in the waiting room) would be classified as
consumer goods since they were "bought for use primarily for per-
sonal, family or household purposes." And the two chairs originally in
the waiting room (now in the livingroom) might also be classified as
consumer goods since they are being "used" primarily for household
purposes. The buyer can change the character of the goods by changing
their use, and, thus, change unperfected interests to perfected. There
seems to be no reason for continuing this state of affairs. The con-
sumer goods concept can be revised to provide more certainty than it
currently does. In section 9-109 the following would accomplish this:
Goods are (1) "consumer goods" if they are of a type which
are normally used for household purposes or they are used or
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household
purposes; . . [New language is italicized.]
Under the suggested definition, a refrigerator of a size normally
used for household purposes would be classified as consumer goods
whether the purchaser bought the refrigerator for use in the house, his
office, a factory or for the purpose of defrauding the seller or others.
Chairs of a type normally used for household purposes would be classi-
fied as consumer goods whether or not they are bought for use or are
used in the livingroom or in the doctor's waiting room. Chairs of a
type normally used commercially would be classified as equipment un-
less they are used or bought for use for family or personal purposes.
By use of the amended section, I believe that several problems currently
raised by the definition of consumer goods would be solved."
39 13CC § 2-403(1).
39 The Official Comment to § 9-109 recognizes this problem. See also, Hogan,
Financing the Acquisition of New Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 115 (1962).
49 I realize that even with the language change, § 9-109(1) remains somewhat un-
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CONSUMER-BUYERS' RIGHTS AND THE ASSIGNEES OF CHATTEL PAPER
PROBLEM II
Dan Davids buys a refrigerator from the Hart Depart-
ment Store, paying $100 down and signing a negotiable note
for the balance of $380. At the same time, Dan signs a security
agreement specifying the refrigerator as the collateral and
designating Hart as the secured party. The refrigerator
is delivered to Dan's home and is used there.
On the day following the sale, Hart transfers the note
and security agreement to the Easy Finance Company, the
company buying the paper for its face value less the usual
discount. Throughout the month, Dan had complained to
Hart and had demanded that the store take back the refrig-
erator and return his $100. About a month after the sale when
the first payment on the note is due, Dan refuses to pay, alleg-
ing that the refrigerator is faulty.
Assume that under Article 2 of the Code, Hart's warranty
obligation in fact has been breached and that the department
store is obliged to refund Dan's money and take back the
refrigerator.4 ' What are Easy Finance's rights against Dan?
Traditionally, Easy Finance, as the holder in due course of the note,
would take the chattel paper free of any warranty defense Dan might
raise.42
 This traditional approach is codified in section 9-206. Subject
to any statute or decision in the individual Code state establishing a
different rule for consumer goods, this section gives Easy Finance the
right to collect the full purchase price from Dan despite his defense of
breach of warranty. The section reads as follows:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes
certain. With the change, however, it covers everything now embraced by the section
and other items normally used in a home. The refrigerator purchased by a lawyer for
office use should be treated no differently from the same refrigerator when purchased
for home use. The vendors of such property, if they wish to take advantage of the per-
fected but unfiled provision of the Code, should be able to do so without being put to the
task of ascertaining the use to which the product is to be put.
41 See UCC §§ 2-601, 2-602.
42 E.g., United States v. Hansett, 120 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1941) ; United States v.
Bryant, 58 F. Supp. 663, 666 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff'd, 157 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Royal
Tire Service, Inc. v. Shades Valley Boys' Club, 232 AIa. 357, 168 So. 139, 140 (1936) ;
Coral Gables, Inc. v. Heim, 120 Conn. 419, 181 Atl. 613 (1935) ; Fabrizio v. Anderson,
62 A.2d 314, 315 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948) ; Rubio Say. Bank v. Acme Farm Prods. Co.,
240 Iowa 547, 37 N.W.2d 16, 19 (1949) ("Knowledge that an instrument was given for
the sale of goods warranted or guaranteed by the seller does not deprive an indorsee of
his status as a holder in due course, if the warranty or guaranty is breached, where the
holder had no knowledge of the breach prior to taking the instrument.") ; Cooke v. Real
Estate Trust Co., 180 Md. 130, 22 A.2d 554, 558 (1941) ; AIropa Corp. v. King's Estate,
279 Mich. 418, 272 N.W. 728, 729 (1937) ; New Jersey Mortgage & Investment Corp. v.
Calvetti, 68 N.J. Super. 18, 171 A.2d 321, 326 (1961). Accord UCC § 3-304(4) (b).
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a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an
agreement by the buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who
takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type
which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial
Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction
signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
makes such an agreement. [Emphasis supplied.]
(2) When a seller retains a purchase money security
interest in goods the Article on Sales (Article 2) governs the
sale and any disclaimer, limitation or modification of the
seller's warranties.
If Hart had retained the chattel paper" arising from the sale, sub-
section (2) of 9-206 would operate to relieve Dan of his obligation on
the note. Since Hart assigned the chattel paper to Easy Finance, how-
ever, and since the agreement is silent concerning defenses against an
assignee, Dan, in most Code states, would have no defense in a suit by
Easy for the full purchase price.
As section 9-206(1) is written, Dan's only defense against Easy
Finance would be that the Code state involved has a "statute or decision"
taking consumer transactions out of the operation of the section. As far
as I can ascertain, no Code state has a decision which operates generally
to give consumer-buyers their warranty defenses against assignees of
chattel paper. Furthermore, only two of the eighteen Code states have
statutes aimed broadly at protecting consumer-buyers against the claims
of such assignees. 44
There is a line of cases holding the assignee of chattel paper
to the seller's warranty when the relationship between the assignee
and the vendor is such as to constitute the assignee an integral part of
the sale transaction itself." On the facts stated here, however, this is
43 UCC § 9-105(1) (b) defines chattel paper as meaning "a writing or writings which
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific
goods. . . ."
44 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 255, § 12C (Sapp. 1962); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 302(9)
(motor vehicles), 403(1) & (3) (1959).
45 E.g., Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark 56, 247 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1952);
Bastian-Blessing Co. v. Stroope, 203 Ark. 116, 155 S.W.2d 892, 893 (1941) ; Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1940). ("We think appellant
was so closely connected with the entire transaction or with the deal that it can not be
heard to say that it, in good faith, was an innocent purchaser of the instrument for
value before maturity. It financed the deal, prepared the instrument, and on the day it
was executed took an assignment of it from the • . [vendor]. Even before it was
executed it prepared the written assignment thereon to itself. Rather than being a pur-
chaser of the instrument after its execution it was to all intents and purposes a party to
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not available to Dan. Easy played no such role, nor is there any
indication that Easy Finance is anything but a holder in due course."
Section 9-206(1) talks in terms of a "decision which establishes a
different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods." The case law,
however, is not couched in terms of special rules for buyers of con-
sumer goods. Where defenses have been available against the assignee,
the courts have not established special or different consumer-buyer
rules." It seems, therefore, that the "decision" exception in 9-206 (1)
is meaningless unless the courts develop an entirely new approach in
the area.
Massachusetts and New York appear to be the only current Code
states with legislation aimed at preserving consumer-buyers' defenses
against the assignee of chattel paper arising from the sale." Three
the agreement and the instrument from the beginning.") ; Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Orange Mach. Wks., 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950) ; Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63
So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Citizens Loan Corp. v. Robbins, 40 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1949);
Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950) (a conspiracy
to defraud was found to exist between the vendor and the assignee).
A New York court, in holding an assignee subject to a buyer's defenses, said:
Looking, without the distortion of ancient notions, at the picture thus pre-
sented, we find the actual control and management of the credit and finance of
sellers doing a conditional sale business in the hands of these finance corporations.
It is obvious that here we have a factual joint enterprise in which, so far as
conditional sales are concerned, the management rests in the far larger part in
the hands of the finance companies. The finance company and the merchant-
seller are as a fact engaged in one business, like Longfellow's description of man
and woman, useless one without the other. To pretend that they are separate
and distinct enterprises is to draw the veil of fiction over the face of fact.
Seeing thus in true focus, should we permit the finance company to isolate
itself behind the fictional fence of the law merchant? Should we give ear to its
protestations that it has followed the Biblical injunction and has let not its right
hand (the finance company) know what its left hand (the sales department) is
doing, and, therefore, should be unbound by the representations to the buyer by
the sales division of the joint business, representations, and promises at variance
with the terms of the printed form, a printed form impossible of reading in the
present instance save with a magnifying glass, and comprehensible only by a
commercial lawyer? Should we thus throw the burden of caution on the un-
trained run-of-the-mill buyer, who by every means known to sales artistry has
been induced to believe that he is dealing with an honorable house? Should not
the risk of the fraud and misrepresentation of the salesman be the risk of the
business, rather than the risk of the unwary buyer? The finance company,
being a de facto part of a great conditional sale commercial machine, should be
no more allowed to escape from the effects of the misrepresentation of a sales-
man than is the merchant himself. This rule imposes no great hardship on the
finance company. Zeal is shown in investigating the credit of the buyer; let zeal
likewise be expended in investigating the good faith of the salesman. If any
hardship is imposed by this rule, it is only the hardship that has always followed
the refusal of the Iaw to permit the divorce of honor from enterprise.
Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 785 (1937).
But cf. United States v. Nousam Realty Corp., 125 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1942).
46 See UCC § 3-302.
4 T See cases cited notes 42 and 45 supra. See also, King, The Unprotected Consumer-
Maker under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Dick. L. Rev. 207 (1961).
45 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1962), reads as follows:
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others among the states which have adopted the Code, Michigan, Penn-
sylvania and Oregon, have legislated in the area.' All three of these
statutes, however, are limited and apply only to the sale of motor
vehicles. Michigan and Oregon, while prohibiting contractual language
waiving defenses against assignees, preserve the right of the assignee
as a holder in due course." Thus, if the prohibited language appears,
the buyer's remedy, apparently, is to sue the vendor for whatever
damages the buyer suffers as a result of having to pay the full purchase
price to the assignee who is a holder in due course."
Promissory Notes Executed in Sales of Consumer Goods Shall
Not Be Negotiable Instruments; Exception.
If any contract for sale of consumer goods on credit entered into
in the commonwealth between a retail seller and a retail buyer requires
or involves the execution of a promissory note, such note shall have
printed on the face thereof the words "consumer note," and such a
note with the words "consumer note" printed thereon shall not be a
negotiable instrument within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial
Code—Commercial Paper. For the purposes of this section "consumer
goods" means tangible personal property used or bought for use
primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
Whoever obtains a note in violation of this section shall be
punished by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five
hundred dollars.
If a note is obtained in violation of this section, no finance,
delinquency, collection, repossession or refinancing charges may be re-
covered in any action or proceeding based on such contract for sale.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to any notes executed
in connection with any financing which is insured under Federal Housing
Administration regulations.
See comment, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1961). N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 302(9), 403(1) &
(3) (1959).
4D Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628(14) (f) (1957) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 615F & G
(Supp. 1962) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 83.650 (1961).
5° Mich. Stat. Ann. § 23.628(14) (f) (1957) :
No installment sale contract shall contain any provision relieving the holder, or
other assignee, from liability for any legal remedies which the buyer may have
had against the seller under the contract or under any separate instrument
executed in connection therewith: Provided, That this subsection shall in no way
impair or affect the rights and powers of a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument.
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 83.650 (1961) :
Effect of negotiation of notes on buyer's rights against seller. (1) No retail in-
stalment contract shall require or entail the execution, by the buyer, of any note
or series of notes, which when separately negotiated will cut off as against third
parties any right of action or defense which the buyer may have against the
seller. (2) The rights of a holder in due course of any negotiable instrument
executed contrary to subsection (1) of this section are not impaired by reason
of the violation of subsection (1) of this section, but the buyer may bring an
action against the seller for the recovery of any loss or expense, including at-
torneys' fees in defending an action on the instrument by the holder, incurred
by reason of the violation of subsection (1) of this section. The buyer's action
may be joined with any other right of action he has against the seller arising
out of the instalment sale.
51 See subsection (2) of § 83.650 of Ore. Rev. Stat. (1961). The Michigan provision
is less clear about the buyer's right to recover against the seller for damages caused
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The Pennsylvania provision is stronger and, as regards installment
sales of motor vehicles, seems adequate. Not only does it contain a pro-
hibition against affirmative provisions waiving the buyer's defenses
against assignees, but, following the Massachusetts-New York pattern,
the section provides: 4'2
No installment sale contract shall require or entail the execu-
tion of any note or series of notes by the buyer, which when
separately negotiated, will cut off as to third parties any right
of action or defense which the buyer may have against the
original seller.
A ban on waiver clauses in time-sale contracts, without a companion
prohibition like that found in Pennsylvania, might prove ineffective
under the Code." The problem is that under section 9-206(1), the
absence of any provision constitutes a waiver of defenses against
assignees. While it is doubtful that silence will constitute a waiver in
the face of regulatory legislation which bans affirmative waiver pro-
visions," the matter is still not clear.
It is clear, however, that in most Code states 9-206(1) operates to
treat all buyers alike, consumer-buyers, in reality, getting no special
treatment." in attempting to satisfy various commercial interests, the
Code draftsmen seem to have shunted aside the interest of the consumer-
buyer. The consumer who buys an item on time and is given a warranty
obviously is unaware of the fact that he will be obligated to pay the
purchase price even if the item purchased never works. There is no
justification for a system which requires Dan to pay Easy Finance month
after month for a refrigerator which is defective and which did not
satisfy the warranty given by the seller. Easy should be restricted to its
recourse against Hart.
Section 9-206(1) should be amended to provide a meaningful con-
sumer-buyer exception which would operate in all Code states, not only
in those few with special legislation. I suggest that the section should
read as follows:
(1) [Subject to any statute or decision which establishes
a different rule] Except for buyers or lessees of consumer
goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
by the seller's failure to comply with the statutory provisions concerning assignments.
See Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 23.628(31), 23.628(37) (b) (1957).
52 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 69, § 615G (Supp. 1962).
53 The Michigan statute operates merely to ban affirmative waiver provisions.
Mich Stat. Ann. § 23.628(14) (f).
54
 UCC § 9-203(2) provides that regulatory statutes such as Installment Sales Acts
will prevail over the Code when they conflict with it.
55
 The section does leave each jurisdiction free to make special provision for the
protection of consumer-buyers. The problem, of course, is that so few jurisdictions have
done so.
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against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who
takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type
which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument under the article on commercial paper
(Article 3). A buyer, other than a buyer of consumer goods,
who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instru-
ment and a security agreement makes such an agreement. A
buyer or lessee of consumer goods shall have the right to assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor, and any agreement to the contrary
shall be void. [Deletions are bracketed. New language is
italicized.]
In opposition to the proposed change in section 9-206, it might be
argued that such a provision would make it impossible, or at the very
least difficult, for retailers to dispose of chattel paper arising out of the
sale of consumer goods. In answer, it can be pointed out that such paper
is sold in states now having such a rule.
Perhaps the experience in New Mexico is relevant to this point.
In 1943, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in a case involving the con-
ditional sale of refrigeration equipment to a restaurant, held that the
assignee of the chattel paper arising from the sale was subject to all of
the buyer's warranty defenses." Although the suit was on the note and
not an attempt to foreclose under the terms of the conditional sales
contract, the court held that the assignee, by virtue of the assignment
of the conditional sales contract along with the note, was subject to all
defenses arising out of the conditional sales contract. This holding came
after the court characterized the assignee of the note as a holder in due
course. The New Mexico decision was not limited to the assignment of
chattel paper arising from the sale of consumer goods, although it en-
compassed such assignments. (In Code terms, the case involved equip-
ment)"
The only real difference between pre- and post-1943 financing in
New Mexico was that the financing institutions of the state required the
retailer to establish a larger reserve to take care of possible warranty
defenses. And further, the consumer-buyer, and other buyers, were
given a potent weapon in enforcing vendors' warranties. If the retailer
refused to give satisfaction, the buyer's next move was to complain to
56
 State Nat'l Bank v. Cantrell, 47 N.M. 389, 143 P.2d 592 (1943). See, e.g., First
& Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771, 774 (1945).
The Nebraska court reached the same result where the note and conditional sale contract
were printed on the same sheet of paper. Von Nordhcim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262
N.W. 832 (1935).
57 UCC § 9-109(2).
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the financing party, or assignee. The financing party was in a position to
put more pressure on the seller than was the buyer himself, and in many
cases did so.
New Mexico's experience would seem to indicate that the holder in
due course concept has no necessary place in the protection of pur-
chasers of chattel paper. In our economy, with so few retailers holding
their own paper, the Code provision defeats the buyer's warranty rights.
He can go against his vendor, of course, but in the meantime, under the
present Code provision, he is required to pay the full purchase price to
a stranger to the transaction. The average consumer-buyer would be
shocked if he realized what he was getting himself into. The consumer-
buyer should not be put in this position. At least for consumer goods,
there should be a uniform rule which grants the consumer-buyer the
same defenses against the assignee of the chattel paper as he now enjoys
against the original seller. Thus, the amendment proposed would oper-
ate to protect the consumer-buyer without unduly hampering the trans-
fer of chattel paper arising from retail sales.
PROBLEM III
George Gens, a resident of a state still operating under
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 58
 purchases a piano there
under a conditional sale contract which the vendor, Popular
Piano, files as required by the U.C.S.A. George pays $100
down and signs a note for the balance of $1,050. The piano is
delivered to George's home where he and his family use it for
three weeks. George then moves to a Code state and has the
piano transported there along with his other household goods.
CONSUMER GOODS AND SECURITY INTERESTS PERFECTED OUT-OF-STATE
Security interests in goods which are perfected out-of-state are
dealt with in Section 9-103 (3) of the Code as follows:
If personal property . . . is already subject to a security
interest when it is brought into this state, the validity of the
security interest in this state is to be determined by the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction wheie
the property was when the security interest attached. . . . If
the security interest was already perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest
58 A few states are still operating under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. E.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ¢§ 44-301 to -330 (1956); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 901-29 (1953); Ind.
Ann. Stat. §§ 58-801 to -829 (1961); S.D. Code §§ 54.0201 to .0229 (1939); W. Va. Code
Ann. §§ 4007-38 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 122.01 to .31 (1957 and Supp. 1962). Alaska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania operated under the U.C.S.A. before their
adoption of the Code. New York also has the U.C.S.A. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 60-81.
It will be repealed in New York on the effective date of the Code, September 27, 1964.
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attached and before being brought into this state, a security
interest continues perfected in this state for four months and
also thereafter if within the four month period it is perfected
in this state.
Assume that within a few weeks of his arrival in the Code
state George borrows $300 from the Easy Finance Company
using the piano as collateral. Assume further that Easy Fi-
nance, following Code procedure, files the security agreement.
And finally, assume that six months later Popular Piano, the
out-of-state vendor, locates the piano and, not having been
paid, attempts to foreclose on it.
If Popular Piano had located the piano in the Code state within the
four month statutory period, section 9-103(3) clearly operates to give
the out-of-state vendor a priority over Easy Finance. The result after
the passage of the four-month period is less clear. A New York court in
Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A. C. Lohman, Inc.," analyzing the four
month Code period, said:
Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the conditional vendor's interest continued to be a perfected
interest for four months. At the end of that period, it ceased
to be a perfected interest and became an unperfected one but
there is no provision which forfeits the four month period of
protection because of the failure to file prior to its expiration.
The four month period under the Uniform Commercial Code is
thus different from the ten day grace period allowed under the
New York conditional sales law for the original filing of a con-
ditional sale contract. . . . Under the New York statute, if
the contract is filed within ten days, the interest of the vendor
is deemed perfected from the beginning but if he fails to file
within ten days, then the security interest of the vendor re-
mains unperfected from the time of the original sale. . . In
contrast with this, the four month period provided in Section
9-103 (3) of the Uniform Commercial Code is not a grace
period for filing; it is an absolute period of protection of the
vendor's security interest designed to give him adequate time
to make an investigation and to locate the property. If the
vendor fails to file within the four month period, the protection
of his security interest ceases upon the expiration of that period
and his unperfected security interest is thereafter subject to
being defeated in the same way in which any unperfected
59 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570, 577 (1962). For a general discussion
of the conflicts provision of Article 9, see Ruud, Part I—Secured Transactions: Article
IX, 16 Ark. L. Rev. 108, 117-23 (1962),
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security interest may be defeated under the Code. A sub-
sequent purchaser for value without notice of the unperfected
security interest would take a title superior to it. . . . But a
prior purchaser who had purchased during the four month
period of statutory protection is not retroactively given a supe-
rior title. He is not in the same position as a subsequent
purchaser who acquired his interest after the expiration of the
four month period.
The Churchill analysis is open to some doubt. As applied to the
problem case, with an intervening secured party such as Easy Finance,
the failure to take action within the statutory period seems to operate,
contrary to Churchill, to defeat the out-of-state interest. This is sug-
gested in Official Comment 7 to 9-103 which states:
The four month period is long enough for a secured party to
discover in most cases that the collateral has been removed
and to file in this state; thereafter, if he has not done so, his
interest, although originally perfected in the state where it
attached, is subject to defeat here by those persons who take
priority over an unperfected security interest (see Section
9-301.) Under Section 9-312 (S) the holder of a perfected con-
flicting security interest is such a person even though during
the four month period the conflicting interest was junior.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Neither the Churchill analysis nor the Official Comment would
seem to be applicable to the problem case, however. Under section
9-109, the piano clearly can be classified as consumer goods. Since
Popular Piano holds a purchase money security interest in the piano, it
would seem that its interest is perfected without filing. 6° For out-of-state
purchase money interests in consumer goods, it would appear that the
four month statutory period during which the out-of-state interest must
be perfected locally has no application. For such interest, since filing is
unnecessary for perfection, no action is necessary.
If the above analysis is accurate, Popular Piano, after the expira-
tion of the four month period, will be deemed to have a perfected though
unfiled security interest in the piano. What is the nature of its interest
during the four month period? Since it filed its interest in the state of
the original sale, will a Code state treat it as having a filed and perfected
interest during the four months, or will it be treated for what it in
fact is in the Code state, as an unified but perfected interest? Section 9-
103 (3) is not clear on this point, merely saying that the interest "con-
tinues perfected" in the Code state. Determining whether or not the
Go Rule 3—UCC 9-302 (1) (d) . See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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interest is to be treated as being filed is conclusive on the rights of a
consumer-buyer of the piano from George during the four month statu-
tory period. Section 9-307 (2), as it is currently written, will protect the
consumer-buyer only if Popular Piano's interest is deemed perfected
but unfiled during the four month period.
Little justification can be found for treating Popular Piano's
interest as a filed interest during the first four months. Such treatment
operates to give the out-of-state lender an interest in the piano superior
to that acquired by the consumer-buyer. Under it, although the interest
in fact is unfiled, the out-of-state party is given more favorable treat-
ment than local purchase money lenders with unfiled interests. Conced-
ing that the conditional vendor has no effective means at his disposal
to prevent his debtor from moving the piano to the Code state, still, by
virtue of the fact that he is in the business of selling on credit, he is
in the business of assuming such a risk. A consumer-buyer does not
understand that a credit risk is involved when he buys the piano. The
only risk he might comprehend is that the piano may be defective.
A conditional vendor, as any other lender, should be careful about
lending his money. Before committing his funds, he can and should
make a credit investigation. If no such investigation is made, to give
the conditional vendor, or other lender, an interest superior to that of
the consumer-buyer is indefensible. The risk that the noncommercial
buyer assumes, if any, is assumed in ignorance. The lender, on the
other hand, assumes his risk knowingly.
If the conditional vendor undertakes a credit investigation reveal-
ing a bad or borderline credit history, and he still lends the money, the
vendor himself should bear the loss. He should not be permitted to pass
it off onto the consumer-buyer. A "safe" borrower rarely involves the
vendor-lender in a situation where, without notice, property is removed
to another jurisdiction. And, indeed, if the borrower is "safe," the lender
can recover from him directly without resort to the security. Whatever
fate may befall the lender, nothing justifies his shifting the risk of loss
to a stranger to the transaction—the consumer-buyer.
By its silence, the conflicts section of the Code causes unnecessary
confusion and uncertainty. The comparative rights of out-of-state
lenders and local consumer-buyers are left for judicial decision. Nothing
justifies such legislative abdication. The conflicts section of Article
9 should provide a solution—one which recognizes the equities favoring
the consumer-buyer.
If the out-of-state interest in consumer goods is deemed perfected
though unfiled for an indefinite period, Popular Piano, despite the official
Code comment, will continue to retain a priority over Easy Finance
beyond the four month period. And if George sells the piano to a con-
sumer-buyer after Easy Finance has perfected its interest, another cir-
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cuity of interest situation arises. The consumer-buyer takes free of the
unfiled out-of-state interest but subject to Easy Finance's filed interest."
Easy Finance, while retaining its interest as against the consumer-buyer,
is junior to the out-of-state secured party." An amendment to section
9-307(2) as previously suggested" will break the circle in favor of the
consumer-buyer, i.e., such buyer will take free of all security interests
whether filed or not.
I question the validity of the Code's operation as between the out-
of-state purchase money secured party and Easy Finance. It seems
that the four month period should be treated as a time within which
action must be taken. The statute should not operate, as it apparently
does, to permit an out-of-state purchase money secured party dealing
in consumer goods to remain wholly inactive locally and still retain a
perfected interest. As regards security interests in goods which may be
perfected without filing and without possession, I would suggest that
section 9-103(3) be amended to require the out-of-state party to act
within the four months, either by filing or by taking possession, or to
lose his status as the holder of a perfected security interest. The longer
the goods and the person are present locally, local parties tend to deal
with them with more confidence. Some cut-off point should operate in
favor of local lenders like Easy Finance. The four month period would
seem to be sufficiently long. I, therefore, suggest an amendment to 9-
103 (3) to accomplish this.
Combining the two suggested changes the section would read as
follows:
(3) If personal property other than that governed by
subsections (1) and (2) is already subject to a security
interest when it is brought into this state, the validity of the
security interest in this state is to be determined by the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where
the property was when the security interest attached. How-
ever, if the party to the transaction understood at the time
that the security interest attached that the property would be
kept in this state and it was brought into this state within thirty
days after the security interest attached for purposes other
than transportation through this state, then the validity of the
security interest in this state is to be determined by the law of
this state. If the security interest was already perfected under
the law of the jurisdiction where the property was when the
security interest attached and before being brought into this
state, the security interest continues perfected in this state for
01 UCC § 9-307(2).
62 UCC § 9-312(5)(b).
63 Sec text following note 32 supra.
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four months and also thereafter if within the four month
period it is perfected in this state. I f the security interest is
not perfected by some affirmative action in this state within
the four month period, it shall be considered to have been un-
perfected from the time it was brought into this state. The
security interest may also be perfected in this state after the
expiration of the four month period; in such case perfection
dates from the time of perfection in this state. If the security
interest was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction
where the property was when the security interest attached
and before being brought into this state, it may be perfected
in this state; in such case perfection dates from the time of
perfection in this state. I f the out-o f-state interest is one which
could have been perfected in this state without taking posses-
sion of the goods and without filing, the out-of-state security
interest shall be deemed to be perfected but unfiled during the
four month period. [New language is italicized.]
CONCLUSION
The thrust of the position taken in this short comment is that the
Code's treatment of the consumer-buyer leaves much to be desired. This
criticism should not be taken as attempted condemnation of the Code as
a whole. My own state, New Mexico, has gained much by the adoption
of the Code. The amendments suggested here are intended for the con-
sideration of the Permanent Editorial Board. It is my hope that the
Board will consider the recommended changes and will take upon itself
the task of representing the one almost totally unorganized group in our
economy—the consumer.
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